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Abstract 
In Switzerland, the issue of land consumption has made it to the front of the political agenda in recent 
years. Studies conducted on a national level have concluded that there is an excess of land zoned for 
construction (ARE, 2008), which is seen as contributing to urban sprawl. This situation is looked upon 
as a failure of the Federal Law on Spatial Planning (LAT, 1979) and there is a political push to 
change it in order to reinforce zoning regulations. 
In this article, we look on the issue from a different angle. While there may be large quantities of land 
zoned for construction, in many urban areas land actually available for development is scarce. 
Building on the idea that planning’s efficiency is linked to its capacity of influencing actual land-use, 
we focus on how this situation can be dealt with within the current Swiss institutional context.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Using land in an efficient way is one of the main objectives of spatial planning. It is generally 
admitted that land is different from most other goods and that the land market is subject to a certain 
number of dysfunctions that make public intervention desirable. However the degree of intervention as 
well as the methods vary from one context to another and are not exempt of an ideological content.  
In Switzerland, spatial planning is subjected to the federal institutional design. This means that 
planning is mainly a cantonal (regional) and municipal (local) competence, whereas the national level 
is in charge of producing general guidelines. With some exceptions, land use planning occurs at the 
local level. Furthermore, land use planning must cope with a fairly strong institution of private 
property rights. Property rights benefit from a constitutional protection. This situation means that, on 
the one hand, interventionist tools that acutely affect private property (expropriation being one of 
them) are very rarely applicable. On the other hand, the land market must stay in mainly private hands. 
This requirement is in practice rather vague. Nevertheless, it does imply that the public bodies cannot 
become too important stakeholders in the land market. This limits the possibilities for large-scale 
active land policies.  
These characteristics play an important role on the way land can be mobilized in the context of urban 
development projects. The Swiss spatial planning regime presents certain weaknesses when it comes 
to controlling actual land use. Planning instruments such as zoning allow for only partial control, 
insofar as they restrict the way in which land can be modified in the future but do not give the 
authorities the means to insure that the present use conforms with the objective stated by the plan. A 
landowner cannot be forced to develop his/her land. The zoning process aims at making land available 
to fit the needs for development in the following fifteen-year period. In the process, it insures new 
development rights to the landowner, thereby increasing the value of his/her real estate. Once this 
process is completed, the owner finds him/herself in a quasi monopoly situation, free to comply or not 
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with the desired land use. It is fairly common for land zoned for development to remain undeveloped. 
There is no simple explanation to this situation. In metropolitan areas, where the pressure on land is 
strong and land prices are rising, it may be advantageous for the landowner to withhold his/her land, 
with the expectation of a higher sale price. Problems may also arise if the cooperation of several 
landowners is needed to develop the area. 
Whatever the reasons behind this decision may be, land retention is a common phenomenon. It leads 
to a paradoxical situation in which the formal land supply is relatively abundant, while the land 
actually available for development is scarce. The consequences are upward pressure on real estate 
prices, the displacement of the demand for construction and extensions of the building zone to areas 
less suitable for development. 
This article builds on the basic distinction between potential land use and actual land use in order to 
point out how this situation can be dealt with within the Swiss context. To do so, we will examine the 
Swiss land management regime. Attention will be given to the institutional construction of spatial 
planning, its objectives and the way it must compose with the land property regime. The weaknesses 
of the current system when it comes to accompanying urban development will be underlined. In the 
last part, we will examine certain solutions that are being used mainly on a regional level in order to 
help mobilize land and increase the success of urban development projects. 
 
2. The gap between zoned land and land use in the Swiss context 
 
Before we discuss the more technical aspects of the Swiss land management regime, it is useful to 
precise the fundamental distinction between land-use as it is defined in the zoning plan (zoned land) 
and the actual use made of the land (land-use). While the first refers to a public body’s intentions 
translated into a binding legal document, the second is the result of the combination of public land 
regulations and the landowner’s own projects, his leeway influenced by his/her property rights. The 
territorial result thus depends on the resources that the public body and individual landowners can call 
upon to pursue their objectives. Zoned land therefore represents a potential land-use. In cases where 
private property rights are strong and/or public regulatory measures are weak, land-use can differ 
significantly from the potential stated by the plan.  
Historically, land-use precedes zoning, given that forms of territorial appropriation have always 
existed. Even in the absence of public regulations, land-use follows certain orderly patterns. The 
German economist Von Thünen (1966) demonstrated this in the 19th century already with respect to 
agricultural land surrounding the city. This means that there is a dependency of zoning on actual land-
use. The gap between potential and actual use is in most cases unidirectional. It occurs when, through 
the zoning process, the public authorities allow increased development on a given piece of land, but 
these development rights are not put into use by the landowner.  
This situation wouldn’t be so problematic, if zoning didn’t imply offering rights to selected 
landowners without any compensation being demanded in return. In a system where the offer of 
buildable zones is restricted, the owners of a plot of constructible land are in a stronghold situation. 
They benefit from the collective value that society is putting on their land, and can take advantage of it 
in a largely private manner.  
The gap between zoned land and land-use, and the question as to how to reduce it, is at the heart of 
some of the key issues in Swiss spatial planning today. On the one hand, the publication of alarmist 
figures concerning land consumption – which according to certain estimates would be around 1.2m2 
per second (OFS, 2001)i – and the establishment of a nation-wide inventory of buildable land stocks 
has brought forth the issue of the oversupply of building zones. Estimates indicate that more than half 
of the land reserves won’t be necessary from here till 2030 (ARE, 2006). These stocks are mostly 
located in more peripheral (periurban or rural) municipalities and are thus seen as a time bomb that 
could potentially contribute to increase urban sprawl. Handling these stocks has become a prominent 
issue, but taking them out of the buildable zone is a very delicate matter, as down zoning is generally 
perceived as a form of expropriation. In this case, the gap between zoned land and land-use is mainly 
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the result of insufficient prospective planning. Municipalities have not properly anticipated the 
demand, the landowners’ intentions, or the consequences of an excess of land supply.  
On the other hand, demographic growth in Swiss metropolitan areas is strong and these areas suffer 
from a structural lack of housing. Though no thorough studies have been conducted, estimations 
indicate that the rate of retention of buildable (greenfield) land in urban areas is between 20% 
(OACOT, 2006) and 65 % (BCV, 2007; I-Consulting, 2011). This land is unavailable for the purpose 
for which it was initially zoned, even though market conditions are favorable to development. The 
reasons behind this phenomenon are complex. Speculation on rising land prices is no doubt one 
aspect. However a recent study (I-Consulting, 2011) has shown that other less “economically rational” 
arguments may play an even more important role, such as preserving family assets or a current use, 
especially in the case of individual landowners. Furthermore, in some cases land development is 
halted by the fact that the cooperation of several landowners is needed to develop a site. These two 
types of ownership constraints match those pointed out by Adams et al (2001, p. 460), namely: (1) 
“ownership assembly required for development” and (2) “owners unwilling to sell or willing but not 
on terms acceptable to potential buyers”. Answering the demand for housing therefore implies 
stimulating the development of hoarded urban land, as well as promoting the redevelopment of 
brownfields. In either case, being able to act on land-use is indispensable. 
The public body’s ability to act on land-use is highly influenced by the institutional context of land 
management. We will talk of the land management regime in reference to public spatial planning laws 
and policies, as well as private land law and property rights. Our attention will focus on key points in 
the Swiss system. 
 
 
3. Swiss land management as a balancing act: a brief historical perspective 
 
A brief look at the land management tradition in Switzerland is useful to understand some of the 
important issues that still shape it today. Spatial planning has become a national policy only relatively 
recently in the late 1970s, which doesn’t mean that urban planning practices and tools didn’t exist 
previously on a local level (Walter, 1989). Cities were indeed the first to produce building and 
planning rules to control urban development. So the construction of the land management system has 
been largely a bottom-up process. The national law on spatial planning (LAT 1979) is in many ways 
the result of a balancing act between heterogeneous interest groups all concerned by some form of 
federal land regulation (Ruegg, 2000). Disagreements especially concentrate around two points: the 
degree of centralization that a national policy implies and the way it will affect property rights.  
During the 1960s-1970s, several initiativesii were launched by progressive and environmental 
conservation milieus to reform land law and create a federal land policyiii as a response to the severe 
housing crisis, inflationist land values and the loss of agricultural land to urbanization (Nahrath, 2005). 
At the same time, the agricultural sector faced with the lack of protection of their land joined in the 
claim for a federal protection. However this powerful lobby has always been vigorously opposed to 
any infringement on private property. The government with the support of the conservative parties 
responded to these claims by proposing a consensus solution: the establishment of a federal spatial 
planning policy – which left aside the most interventionist land law instruments – was to be 
accompanied by the constitutional protection of private property rights. Nevertheless, the initial law, 
which still included the possibility to retrieve development gains from zoning, was rejected by 
referendum. Aside from the unpopularity of this measure, the main oppositions stemmed from 
federalist lobbies fearing the weakening of cantonal competences to the profit of the federal 
administration. The final, “lighter” version of the LAT is in many ways a weakened instrument and 
hardly adapted to deal with the complex situations arising in urban settlements.  
 
4. The federal institutional layout of spatial planning 
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Land management in Switzerland is articulated around the three institutional levels. Swiss federalism 
entails that the cantons are responsible for most spatial planning, which means that fairly little actual 
planning occurs at the national level. Planning has a constitutional basis and its general framework is 
given by the LAT, which establishes the necessary elements that must be taken into consideration. The 
Cantons nevertheless have considerable leeway to decide the way in which they will apply these 
principles. This explains why interesting planning innovations occur more often at a regional 
(cantonal) or local (municipal) level (ARE, 2007).  
Three types of plans are explicitly defined in the federal law. On a national level, the Confederation 
has the obligation to establish sectoral plans for those of its activities, which have effects on the 
territorial organization (art. 13 LAT). This is typically the case of military or national transport 
infrastructures. These plans are binding on the subordinate administrations as well as on the 
landowners. In this sense they are land-use plans. However, their scope is limited. That said, the law 
does not call for a comprehensive federal master plan defining the general territorial organization on a 
national level. Master plans are on the other hand mandatory on a cantonal level. They serve to 
coordinate all territorial activities with respect to the desired development, and must define the order 
in which these activities will be developed as well as the necessary measures to be taken (art. 8 LAT). 
Master plans must get federal approval. The Cantons also have the responsibility to define who is 
competent for land-use planning. In most cases, this procedure is left to the municipalities. By law, 
zoning must separate buildable land from agricultural and protected zones (art. 14 LAT). Buildable 
zones should match the construction needs for a 15-year period (art. 15 LAT). 
Spatial planning having been mostly a local procedure before the introduction of the LAT, one of the 
important goals of the law is to create coordination between administrative entities, on a horizontal 
and vertical level. One of the ways this works is by subjecting plans of a lower level to the approval of 
the higher administrative instance. This is particularly important given the absence of a binding 
comprehensive national plan. In this configuration, the land-use plan occupies a strategic position as 
the interface between planning as a tool for managing public spatial policies and planning as land-use 
rights for the landowners (Moor, Commentary of the LAT, art. 14 N.51). 
  
5. Overcoming institutional and sectoral barriers  
 
In handling urban development issues, the federalist and sectoral conception of planning suffers some 
weaknesses. Local interests can have a determining influence, especially when the superior 
administrations do not really take on the role of coordinators and the implementation of the LAT has 
not really been able to go beyond sectoral separations. A large number of different issues converge in 
cities, making coordination a necessity. Lack of coordination between housing policies and land-use 
planning can prevent the development of much needed projects. In the Canton of Geneva, long lasting 
disputes between urban planning and the agricultural sector have led to numerous stale mate 
situations, while lack of housing is a growing problem. One can also mention the fact that land 
taxation can counteract planning goals. Real property gains taxes or taxes on real estate transactions 
can induce adverse effects such as raised land prices or land retention (Deiss et al., 1989). 
Furthermore, the small size of the institutional territory (26 Cantons and 2500 municipalities in a 
country of 41 000 km2) doesn’t match the functional territories in urban and metropolitan areas. Lack 
of cooperation can generate totally inefficient solutions and tends to contribute to free-rider strategies 
amongst municipalities. The LAT does not offer any particular solution to this issue. The planning 
tools it calls for are indeed the same for all types of municipalities, whether urban or rural (Nahrath, 
2005). Nonetheless, within the framework given by the LAT, the regional and local public bodies are 
free to develop more specific instruments. 
As a way to push forward collaborative approaches in the urban realm, the Confederation has 
proposed a policy for urban agglomerations, which establishes a series of incentives for innovation. 
Importantly, the federal government has linked its financial contributions towards agglomeration 
transport infrastructures to the creation of an agglomeration project. These projects must follow 
certain criteria with respect to urban and transport planning, environmental measures, participation, 
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and they must designate the responsible administrative entity. A large majority of the 55 
agglomerations that Switzerland counts have submitted a project. The institutional design for these 
projects is quite diverse. For instance, the municipalities of greater Fribourg have created a political 
agglomeration – which takes over certain previously municipal competences – while Neuchâtel has 
developed a project based on bilateral administrative conventions between the Canton and individual 
municipalities, and – in some cases – private stakeholders. It is too early to evaluate the success of 
these projects. However it is important to mention that local interests remain a strong force and that 
financial advantages and compensations due to the implementation of joint planning are and will 
continue to be at the core of difficult negotiations.   
 
Fig 1: institutional layout of Swiss spatial planning 
 
6. Planning and private property rights 
 
Institutional design and coordination certainly play an important role in the public body’s ability to 
engage in coherent and efficient land-use planning. However, even well conceived policies are limited 
by the legal framework given by the land-management regime. As in most countries, Swiss land 
management is made up of a combination of rules of private and public law. The first define the way 
in which land may be appropriated, and the second regulate state intervention in land-use planning.  
The intense political maneuvering that surrounded the creation of the LAT led to the simultaneous 
entry of two articles into the Constitution. The basis for planning is found in article 75: “The 
Confederation shall lay down principles on spatial planning. These principles shall be binding on the 
Cantons and serve to ensure the appropriate and economic use of the land and its properly ordered 
settlement » (art. 75, al. 1 Cst.). This article is however preceded by the fundamental article on 
property rights: “The right to own property is guaranteed” (art. 26, al 1. Cst). The original layout of 
these two articles in the Constitution of 1969, one following the other directly (art. 22ter and 
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22quater), indicated the dependence of planning on property rights. This setup has a direct impact on 
the way planning can interact with private property.  
 
Fig 2: Private property as a fundamental constitutional right 
 
The guarantee placed on private property has several important implications. Legal doctrine and 
jurisprudence evoke two understandings of this concept. The first has to do with the institution of 
private property itself (“objective guarantee”). The second defines the landowner’s protection of his 
property (“subjective guarantee”). 
This second, and somewhat less abstract definition, clarifies the conditions under which restrictions 
may be made to private property. A restriction must have a legal basis, be motivated by public interest 
and be reasonable with respect to the goal it seeks to reach. Importantly, the legal basis for “formal” 
expropriation, allows such a measure to be taken only in cases where strong national public interest 
can be justified (LEx 1930). This includes important public works such as national transport 
infrastructure but does not apply in the case of planning measures. Thus, planning is deprived of an 
important incentive – even if it is only used as a last resort – to foster the landowners’ collaboration to 
reach the planned land-use.  
Furthermore, the Constitution mentions that a full indemnity must also be paid to landowners who 
suffer restrictions on the use of their property, which are equivalent to an expropriation. This is 
referred to as “material” expropriationiv. The issue of interest to planning is to what extent and under 
which conditions reducing or annulling building rights on a parcel of land can be considered as 
material expropriation. The definition and evolution of the content of material expropriation is a story 
in itself. Given the political sensibility of this question, it has largely been left to the Federal Court. 
One of the main criteria influencing the decision is the probability that the land will actually be built 
up. Jurisprudence shows that the implementation of the federal law on spatial planning has made the 
courts adopt a more restrictive definition of material expropriation in order to protect local authorities 
from unbearable financial compensation (Moor, 2002). Thus, in order to be considered as 
constructible land must be in the buildable zone, serviced and the landowner must have demonstrated 
a willingness to use his/her building rights. This seems to leave a window of opportunity for local 
authorities to remove land from the buildable zone when the landowner clearly has no intentions of 
developing it, without having to suffer the financial burden of compensation. Nevertheless, it remains 
a very delicate operation and municipalities are particularly hesitant to take this step. 
The implication of an “objective guarantee” is that the essence of what constitutes the institution of 
private property must be preserved. Its concrete consequences are somewhat vague. On the one hand, 
the land market must remain in mostly private hands. This excludes any form of land nationalization 
and restrains the public bodies from becoming too important stakeholders in the land market. 
However, no upper limit has been defined as to how much land local authorities can ownv. Practices in 
the matter are diverse. Most municipalities own little land and use it only very marginally for planning 
purposes. But some municipalities are actually developing a fairly active land policyvi. Nevertheless, 
local authorities are not particularly encouraged to do so and there is no legal disposition that would 
help them finance such measures.  
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On the other hand, the content of private property – the rights of the landowner to dispose of and to 
use his/her property – must remain meaningful. Land-use planning, which only defines how land can 
be used but not how it has to be used, is compatible with the institution of private property. But the 
introduction of mandatory land-use measures (such as an obligation to develop, or minimum land-use 
requirements) is a more delicate matter particularly if a formal legal basis is lacking. Yet, in so far as 
land retention and the loss of agricultural surfaces are recognized as obstacles to a cautious and 
reasonable use of land, the public interest of mandatory land-use requirements is less and less 
contestable (Bianchi, 1990, p. 95). Public interest is in itself an evolving notion. The balancing of 
interests that it implies seems, today, to lean increasingly towards preserving land.  
 
 
7. Planning for, against or with the landowners?  
 
Landowners, in Switzerland, benefit from a strong protection. Municipalities seeking to have a tighter 
control on actual land-use in order to increase development or densities in strategic zones cannot count 
on the effective impact of a tool such as expropriation. A generalization of public land acquisition 
policies also seems unlikely. It’s a long-term strategy and raises the question of its compatibility with 
the democratic procedure. The necessity to get parliament approval for investments over a certain 
amount reduces the public bodies’ capacity to react to market opportunities. On the contrary, the 
creation of an independent public-private company with the mandate to manage public real estate 
leads to a certain democratic opacity (Nahrath et al., 2009).  
What’s more, municipalities are also financially constricted by the necessity to compensate 
landowners who suffer important restrictions on the use of their property. The mandatory creaming off 
of planning gains has been left out of federal law, thereby complicating the creation of an effective 
compensation system between the beneficiaries and losers of a planning measure. Nevertheless, the 
argument we wish to develop here is that possibilities already exist and are being used under the 
current regime to narrow the gap between private land-use and planned land-use and to increase 
proactive planning. They just require a slight change of paradigm. 
The institutional construction of land management seems to reflect the conception of landowners as 
mere victims of state planning. Yet, for obvious political reasons, land-use planning especially in 
small municipalities tends to closely follow the landowners’ interests. More generally, zoning offers 
legal protection to landowners and increases real estate values. Historically landowners were often 
favorable to the implementation of zoning (Ruegg, 2000). That land-use planning actually offers 
development rights – as opposed to development rights being an intrinsic characteristic of property – 
has been recognized by jurisprudencevii and legal doctrine (Moor, 1976, p. 464). Such an outlook 
opens the possibility for a type of planning, that takes into account the advantages offered to 
landowners in order to negotiate collectively desirable solutions.  
Several points deserve to be explored. Making actual land-use fit to planned land-use requires to act 
on different aspects, namely (1) reducing the possibility for withholding land zoned for construction or 
for under-exploiting the building potential; (2) increasing public control over development gains 
produced by zoning, in order to be able to compensate those losing out on the process; (3) making 
landowners participate in the costs generated by land servicing (transport, water, sewage and 
electricity infrastructures), public spaces and municipal equipment. 
(1) Regarding the first point and the issue of land retention: technocratic planning consisting in 
drawing up zoning plans that are later on confronted to landownership implicitly relinquishes 
municipal negotiating power. Yet this way of proceeding remains common.  
Some cantonal legislation, such as that of the Canton of Fribourg, encourage the signing of 
conventions between the authorities and individual landowners, stating the deadline by which land 
must be developed. Though the legal strength of a convention isn’t great, this method has the 
advantage of clarifying the owners’ intentions. A more coercive measure is that adopted by the Canton 
of Obwald, who has introduced a deadline of ten years within which zoned land must be built. Past 
this deadline, the municipality can make use of an “emption” right to purchase the land (art. 11a 
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Baugesetz Kanton Obwald). Introducing minimal density requirements (minimal floor space index) 
can also help counter the tendency to underuse building possibilities, especially in areas where land 
reserves are abundantviii.  
(2) Secondly, increasing public control on development gains helps balance the gains and losses 
generated by the planning process. This can help relieve the planning procedure from the distortions 
created by financial windfalls or losses. If up zoning creates added value for the landowners, 
opportunities exist for capturing and reallocating development gains. The LAT (art. 5) states that 
cantonal law should provide a compensation regime for gains and losses due to planning, but does not 
specify concrete measures or the extent of compensation. Up till now, only three Cantons have directly 
translated this possibility into their legislations.  
In Basel-Stadt, building regulations allow 50% of development gains due to increased building rights 
to be retrieved. The system initially imagined was to permit a symmetrical compensation of capital 
losses generated by planning. But, no legal definition of the situations giving right to compensation 
has been formulated. So as in the rest of Switzerland, the issue of compensation for material 
expropriation has been left to jurisprudence (Plattner, 1992). As such the Basel model isn’t a “perfect” 
compensation system. The resources obtained from taxing the added value are nevertheless put to 
financing municipal equipments such as parks, walkways, etc. An important point is that the 
landowner’s financial contribution is due only when the new building potential is put to use (when 
construction begins). Thus, the tax does not act as an incentive to buildix.  
Alternatively, the system proposed by Neuchâtel seeks to make land available for construction. Only 
20% of the increased value created by zoning is retrieved. But the time frame within which the tax is 
perceived is determined by planning needs and the possibilities for using the land (art. 37 LCAT 
Canton de Neuchâtel). The owners’ contribution does not remain in municipal hands but goes to a 
cantonal fund. It then helps to finance different planning measures and notably the claims made by 
landowners on the grounds of material expropriation.  
Geneva has just recently voted a law allowing the taxation of 15% of planning gain. The tax applies 
only to land converted from a non-buildable (mainly agricultural) to a buildable zone. The product of 
the tax goes to a cantonal fund, which helps finance compensations for material expropriation as well 
as certain public infrastructures (notably schools and cultural facilities). Interestingly, it also 
contributes to a fund, which supports local farmers and helps promote their products. This is an 
indirect recognition of the fact that not only landowners are affected by land-use decisions. Many 
farmers don’t own the land they farm and the leasehold offers them very little protection in case of a 
change in land-use planning.  A recent case involving the future development of an area currently 
cultivated by a farming cooperative, shows the potential consequences of this situation. Having no 
possibilities to relocate or be compensated, the farm has launched a popular referendum aiming at 
repealing the new zoning measure.  
Other cantons are currently discussing the possibility of introducing measures for retrieving 
development gains in their spatial planning legislation. The system imagined in Appenzell AR is 
interesting in that it proposes a partial refund of the tax if land is quickly built up. Finally, it is useful 
to mention that most cantonal fiscal legislations do tax capital gains in one form or another when real 
estate is sold.  
(3) Thirdly, making landowners participate in the costs generated by land servicing, public spaces and 
municipal infrastructure helps to secure the implementation of the planning measures. It insures the 
implication of landowners in the development process and makes them less likely to retain their land 
for future use. It also guarantees the financing of the needed infrastructure.  
By law, local authorities are responsible for servicing all buildable zones. But the law does give them 
the freedom to define the landowners’ contribution (Art. 19 LAT). This can be done on a contractual 
basis between municipalities and the landowners. It once again depends on the municipality’s ability 
and willingness to negotiate. In the Canton of Bern, more than 75% of all municipalities have 
negotiated infrastructure contracts in which the granting of new building rights is linked to the other 
party’s financial or land contribution (Stirnemann, 1992). And, even if infrastructure contracts aren’t 
mentioned in any planning law, the Federal Court has recognized the validity of the exchangex. This 
allows for at least partial cost recovery.  
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Another way of proceeding is for the authorities to impose certain requirements on developers. In the 
canton of Geneva, developers of land in the so-called “development zone” have the obligation to 
produce 25-30% social housing, or to sell the necessary land to the state at a fixed price (LGDZ 
Geneva). As for the “capturing” of the added value generated by public investments in infrastructures 
and public spaces, art. 5 of the LAT could perhaps offer a legal basis. Given that the improvement of 
public equipment can generate considerable value for the surrounding properties, it seems accurate to 
consider that it is part of the gains offered by planning. 
 
Figure 3: Measures being used to increase public control over actual land use 
 
Finally, the possibility to couple land-use planning and land readjustment shows promising results on 
all three aspects. This procedure makes it possible to act upon the layout of properties – in order to 
make them compatible with the desired project – and to establish a perequation in the designated area, 
which balances the costs and gains amongst the landowners. Land is pooled and the total added-value 
produced by the project is not only redistributed fairly to all landowners as new building rights, but 
also serves to finance investments in public equipment (financial or land contributions). Importantly, 
this method can also be used for land that has already been zoned, to unblock a long-standing status 
quo situation. Though this procedure is explicitly mentioned in the LAT (art. 20), few Cantons have 
formally made use of it (On this matter see Weber et al 2011, published in the report of COST TU602 
working group 2). 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
Making actual land use match with planned land use may seem at first like a trivial problem, which 
can be resolved on its own in the long run. However, as this article has tried to show, this issue is in 
fact central to spatial planning. It raises the question of planning’s role and capacity to shape 
tomorrow’s spatial patterns. This question is obviously more than a technical one. Whether land-use 
decisions should mainly be left to the market or tightly controlled by the public bodies is largely a 
political choice.  
In Switzerland, planning has been characterized by the strength of regional and local levels over 
national strategies and by the absence of interventionist land management tools. Its focus has often 
been narrow with respect to other spatial public policies. This organization fits in with the federal 
institutional framework, but it is also a reminder that historically planning rules were first developed 
on a local level. As in other southern European countries, there is a tradition of urban planning through 
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detailed zoning and building regulations, which is closer to urban design than to comprehensive 
planning. Most of the Swiss planners have a background in architecture.  
Furthermore, land-use planning has frequently been approached in a somewhat technocratic way by 
the municipalities without a clear appraisal of the behavior of the other stakeholders in the land market 
(landowners, developers, investors, etc). This has contributed to the oversupply of buildable zones in 
certain areas, and generally to diminishing the public body’s possibilities for negotiating collectively 
advantageous solutions. The results of these planning practices have yet to be dealt with today. 
These observations are true on a general level. Nevertheless, examples exist on a local level of 
municipal administrations that have taken up fairly proactive land management. These cases tend to 
demonstrate that coupling planning with strategies for gaining control over land-use – whether through 
direct possession and sale or lease, or through the negotiation of floor space index and building rights, 
or land readjustment, or other strategies – increase the speed and quality of urban productions. They 
also show that, though these practices aren’t explicitly laid down in the national legislation on 
planning, they are nonetheless compatible with it. This flexibility is worthwhile taking into account. 
Indeed, the current preoccupation with land consumption and urban sprawl has put the LAT under the 
spotlight. The law is scheduled for revision in the near future and many wish to make it more 
normative on land-use. Notably, the population will have to vote on an initiativexi, launched by several 
environmental organizations, which would freeze the total amount of buildable land in Switzerland for 
the next 20 years. Though the idea may be seductive, its immediate consequences would be to increase 
the shortage of land in urban areas where the demand is strong, and to favor the development of 
peripheral municipalities with extensive buildable zones. In order to make the system work, a nation-
wide compensation system involving the transfer of development rights from rural to urban areas 
would have to be put into place. In a federal state like Switzerland, this seems like an ambitious goal. 
Nevertheless, it points at the importance of overcoming localism in order to rethink trade-offs at a 
regional level.  
To conclude, we can say that the issue of land management has been left out of the political and 
research agenda of spatial planning in the past two decades. In order to increase the understanding of 
planning’s effect on actual land use, more research needs to be done on the strategies followed by the 
different stakeholders in the land market, as well as on the effects of the very diverse land 
management measures developed on the local and regional levels. 
 
 
                                                      
i This figure accounts for the loss of agricultural land. The rate of land consumed for urbanization is actually around 
0.8m2/second, while the rest is accounted for by the progression of forests. These are mean values calculated over a period of 
about 10 years. 
ii The Swiss political system gives citizens the right of initiative to propose legislative or constitutional amendments. 
iii The reform included increased state powers of preemption and expropriation and the possibility to retrieve development 
gains, as well as an increase in public landownership. 
iv Also known as a “regulatory taking”. 
v As far a we know, no Federal Court decision has be taken based on the objective guarantee on property. 
vi The cities of Bienne, Zürich and La Chaux-de-Fonds have been active on the land market in order to pursue different land 
management goals (better control over land-use, fighting speculation, social housing, etc) 
vii Federal Court Order, Meyer, ATF 105 Ia 330ss, 1981 
viii The rural Canton of Jura has introduced this measure in its master plan. 
ix The design of the tax could in fact have a dissuasive effect on construction, given that it burdens the owners at the very 
moment when financial resources also have to be put out for the construction project. 
x Federal Court Order, Ostermundigen vs. PK, march 26th 1985. 
xi The so-called Landscape initiative launched in 2007. 
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Figure 1: Institutional layout of Swiss spatial planning 
 
Figure 2: The Swiss land management regime 
 
Figure 3: Measures being used to increase public control over actual land use 
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